People seem to have a rather rich repertoire of tactics for regulating moods and dealing with unpleasant events. The current work examines one such tactic. It suggests that in order to render a disappointing reality more palatable, people sometimes change the perceived probabilities of relevant events post-facto, so that the disappointing reality appears almost inevitable and the more positive alternatives now seem highly unlikely. This "retrospective inevitability" effect was demonstrated in two studies. In the first, participants were asked to imagine themselves in a situation in which they experienced a disappointing outcome, and then assess the likelihood that a more favorable alternative could have occurred. In the second, participants were asked to evaluate each candidate's chances of winning in the recent Prime Minister race in Israel, before and after the elections.
. When one can easily imagine a multitude of more favorable outcomes and a host of ways in which an unfortunate event could have been avoided, the fact that the incident had nevertheless occurred despite its "mutability" seems to enhance its emotional impact. To illustrate this point Miller, Turnbull, and McFarland (1990) contrasted the fate of two passengers killed in an air crash. One of the passengers was booked on this flight for weeks. The other passenger just switched to this flight a few minutes before take-off. Although both passengers perished in the same Mitigating disappointments 4 accident, the death of the second was experienced as more tragic. An alternative scenario which restores "normality" (e.g., "if only he did not switch flights") is quick to suggest itself, and it is this high mutability of the "just switched" scenario which amplifies its emotional impact. This amplification effect was demonstrated in a relatively large number of experiments in which various methods were employed to increase the mutability and consequently the emotional impact of negative events (see Roese 1997) . Not much explicit attention was paid, however, to the fact that while increasing the mutability of an event amplifies its negative impact, transforming its circumstances so that perceptions of inevitability are promoted is likely to produce just the opposite effect.
In view of the above it is no wonder that pointing out the inevitability of a tragic event is often used by well-intending others as a means of consolation. Even if a negative event was not entirely inevitable, solace could still be obtained by noting that the more positive alternatives, although possible, were highly improbable. Thus, a student who failed to be accepted into a prestigious graduate program could remind himself that the program only takes two students each year out of four hundred applicants. Similarly, reminding yourself of a journal's rejection statistics may come in particularly handy when that journal's editor had just failed to recognize the merits of your work.
The objective probability of many events in our life is not, however, as readily available as professional journal rejection statistics. Often we have to subjectively evaluate these probabilities, and following some form of Bayesian logic continue to refine and readjust our estimates in line with our ongoing Mitigating disappointments 5 experiences. Thus, for example, before we call to invite someone on a date, we will be wise to consider the probability of being rejected. If we decided to go ahead and make that call we are likely to readjust our rejection estimates up or down based on the result of the phone conversation.
According to the hindsight bias literature, retrospective, post-facto readjustments of probability estimates are not only natural, but almost inescapable (Christensen-Szalanski & Willham, 1991; Fischhoff, 1975; Hawkins & Hastie, 1990; Wasserman, Lempert & Hastie, 1991) . Once the outcome of an event is known the perception of causes leading to this outcome shifts so that they engulf the representation of the past in way that makes this outcome appear predetermined. Fischhoff (1975) used the term "creeping determinism" to illustrate the "sneaky" nature of this reassessment process. The retroactive increase in probabilities assigned to an outcome takes place without awareness, to the extent that the possible influence of outcome information may actually be denied.
The hindsight bias is generally discussed in terms of information selection, evaluation, and integration. Its underlying mechanisms are described first and foremost in cognitive terms, while the contribution of motivational factors, beyond the general need to make sense of our past experiences, seems to be less central (Fischhoff 1975, Hawkins and Hastie 1990) . Nevertheless, a similar process of reevaluation may serve more specific needs. If we are inclined to view inevitable events as less tragic, as suggested by counterfactual research, could we not employ "hindsight tactics"
to help ourselves deal with disappointments?
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The goal of the current work was to test the idea that when faced with disappointment people may mentally minimize the estimated odds for a better outcome post-facto, thus making the actual outcomes more palatable. It is further suggested that these retroactive estimate shifts will be larger the greater is the disappointment.
Two experiments were conducted in order to test this idea. The first experiment employed a scenario methodology while the second took advantage of naturally occurring disappointments during the 1999 Prime Minister election in Israel.
In the first experiment participants were asked to imagine themselves in a situation in which they are trying to get to a store on time so that they can enjoy a special sale price. By the time they reach the store it is already closed. The magnitude of the disappointment was manipulated by varying the attractiveness of the sale price. A control condition in which judgements were made without knowledge of outcomes was also included in the design.
In addition the first study included a measure of individual differences in desire for control. This scale was included in the assumption that if people indeed shift their likelihood estimates in an attempt to control and regulate their mood, persons high in the desire for control may be more likely to show this effect.
Experiment 1 Method
Participants. Fifty-seven introductory psychology students (9 men and 48 women) at Sapir College (a college associated with Ben-Gurion University) participated in this study in exchange for course credit.
Mitigating disappointments 7
Procedure. The experimental session was held in a large classroom.
The students were randomly assigned to one of six cells in a 2 x 3 design with two levels of price reduction value (large reduction vs. small reduction) and three levels of circumstances (prior to outcome, following success, following failure). During the experimental session all participants completed a desire for control scale and then read and responded to one of the scenario conditions according to their condition.
Materials.
Desire for control. This scale was developed by Burger & Cooper (1979) in order to measure general motivation for control over the environment. The scale includes 20 items (e.g., "I prefer a job where I have a lot of control over what I do and when I do it"), which are rated by the respondents using the numbers 1 to 7 according to the extent to which each statement is judged to be self-descriptive.
Scenario. The scenario consisted of a short paragraph. In the large reduction -failure condition, this paragraph read as follows (the text for the small reduction -success conditions is shown in parentheses 1 ):
"For a while now you have been looking to purchase a relatively hard to find Swatch model. Last Thursday around five in the evening you meet a friend at the university in Beer-Sheva who reproaches you for not returning his call in the beginning of the week. This time, he says, it was your loss.
Apparently he wanted to tell you that he came across a store in Bugrashov Street in Tel-Aviv that carries the watch you wanted and even has it on a special deal, 195 (300) shekels instead of the 350 which is the regular price.
He also tells you that this is a time-limited offer, and today is in fact the last Mitigating disappointments 8 day for this special price. Who knows, he says, if you hurry you may still make it on time.
You rush home to change and take some cash and order a taxi to the central bus station. You wait anxiously for the bus to Tel-Aviv, which for some reason appears to be late. Glancing at your watch you notice that it is already five thirty. When at last you arrive in Tel-Aviv, it is rush hour and it takes some time before you find a taxi. When you reach Bugrashov Street you realize you don't have the exact address and it is not easy to locate the store which is rather small. Finally, when you reach the store you are disappointed to find out that your efforts were in vain as the store is already closed.
(Finally, when you reach the store your are pleased to find out that your efforts were successful as the store is still open.) A sign in the window clarifies that today is indeed the last day for the special offer."
The dependent measure question was presented directly after the scenario and as a part of it, as follows:
"On the bus going back to Beer-Sheva you try to figure out in retrospect what were the chances of arriving at the store on time considering that you left Beer-Sheva rather late. You conclude that your chances to get to the store on time were…" Participants rated their estimates on an 11-point scale ranging from 0 (almost zero) to 10 (very high).
The "prior to outcomes" condition scenario was identical to the one above except that it terminated before the participant arrives at the store.
After the sentence concerning the difficulties of getting a taxi in Tel-Aviv during rush hour, the following sentence was added: "In the taxi heading arriving at the store on time considering that you left Beer-Sheva rather late.
You conclude that your chances to get to the store on time are…" The same rating scale was used here.
Results
The mean probability ratings in the six groups are presented in Table   1 . In order to avoid a problem of very small n's the results were first analyzed without categorization into high and low desire for control (DC). This categorization, based on a median split (Midian=5.05), was added as a third variable later in the analysis.
A two-way ANOVA on participants' probability ratings revealed a significant main effect for the circumstances, F(2,110)= 9.65, p<.0001. The ratings of participants in the success and the prior to outcomes groups were not significantly different (F<1). Consistent with the hindsight bias, ratings of participants in the "failure" condition were significantly lower compared to the ratings of participants in both the "success" condition (Ms. 3.43 vs. 5.13, F(1,113)=13.9, p<.0002) and the "prior to outcomes" condition (Ms. 3.43 vs.
4.97, F(1,113)=11.6 p<.009).
The main effect for circumstances was qualified by a significant interaction between the circumstances and the reduction value, F(2,110)=3.76, p<.02. To further explore this interaction the mean ratings of participants in the large and the small reduction conditions were compared separately at each level of circumstances.
As predicted, the size of the reduction had a significant effect on the probability ratings of participants in the failure condition. If by failing to arrive at the store on time participants missed out on a large reduction, their Mitigating disappointments 10 retroactive estimates were significantly lower than those of participants who missed out on a relatively small price reduction, F(1,110)=4.46, p<.03.
Large and small reduction groups did not differ significantly in the "prior to outcomes" condition (F<1). In the success condition, however, probability ratings in the large reduction group tended to be higher than those in the small reduction group with marginal significance, F(1,110)=3.12, p<.08.
Reanalyzing the results this time with DC as a third variable revealed a significant 3-way-interaction, F(2,102)=3.05, p<.05. As can be seen in Figure   1 , the pattern of results identified above was characteristic of people with high desire for control, but not for those with low desire for control. Specific pair-wise comparisons for each of the three outcome groups revealed that the attractiveness of the reduction had no significant effect on the likelihood ratings of low DC participants (all F's <1). Simple comparisons for the high DC participants showed that the magnitude of the reduction had no significant effect on likelihood ratings in the prior to outcomes condition (F<1). Large and small reduction groups did however differ significantly in the success and failure high DC conditions. Those experiencing success rated the likelihood of arriving on time significantly higher in the large reduction compared to small reduction condition (Ms. 6.57 vs. 3.75) F(1,102)=7.97, p<.005. Reduction magnitude had exactly the opposite effect on participants in the failure group.
Participants in the large reduction failure condition indicated lower likelihood estimates when they missed a large rather than a small price reduction (Ms 2.61 vs. 4.50) F(1,102)=5.96, p<.01.
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Discussion
The results of experiment 1 supported the idea that post facto assessments of outcome probabilities are sometimes influenced by the desirability of these outcomes. Participants who failed to secure an attractive deal rated the likelihood of a counterfactual alternative (i.e., getting to the store on time) as significantly lower compared to participants who failed to secure a less attractive deal. The suggestion that this shift in assessment represents an attempt to deal with disappointment is supported by the fact that attractiveness of the deal had no significant effect on assessments made before the outcomes were known.
The notion that by playing with the odds people may be able to contain or control their disappointments is further supported by the fact that this shift seems to characterize first and foremost people with high desire for control.
The level of desire for control had little effect on the judgements of individuals in the prior to outcomes conditions. It seems that the emotional regulation aspect of the desire for control becomes particularly relevant when the outcomes are already known and are being psychologically processed. Individuals with high desire for control could be thought of as people who take more liberties in manipulating perceived events in a way that is conducive to a positive sense of self. This characterization may explain not only the fact that they show more evidence of the retrospective inevitability effect, but also the higher ratings of probability following a significant rather than a more minor success.
The notion of hindsight with a self-serving "twist" was again tested in Experiment 2. Unlike the first experiment in which an imaginary scenario was Mitigating disappointments 12 used, the setting of the second study was entirely real. On the 17 th of May, 1999, a Prime Minister election was held in Israel. In Israel the Prime Minister is the leader of the country, a role equivalent to that of a president in the United States. Thus this election was extremely important to many Israelis, some of whom were bound to be disappointed with its outcomes.
A few days before the elections students were asked to assess the chances of each of the three major candidates: Benyamin Netanyahu, Itzhak
Mordechai, and Ehud Barak. These estimates were later compared to retroactive estimates made after it was already known that Ehud Barak won the election.
Experiment 2 Method
Participants. Three hundred and eighty-seven undergraduate students at Ben-Gurion University, majoring in economics (40), psychology (138), and industrial engineering (164), participated in this study on a voluntary basis. Of these, only the data from two hundred and two participants who completed both the before and after questionnaires was used in the analyses.
Procedure. The participants completed the first questionnaire 5-6 days before the election and the second 2-3 days after Election Day. Both questionnaires were completed in large auditoriums during scheduled class breaks. Because of these less than optimal conditions, the questionnaires were kept as short as possible. The participants were told that they would be asked about their voting intentions, and, after the election, about their reactions to the results. They were asked to choose an identifying number or name that would make it possible to match their responses before and after Mitigating disappointments 13 the election while maintaining their anonymity. Participants who failed to indicate an identification number, forgot the identification they used initially, or were absent from class during one of the two sessions were not included in the analyses.
Materials. In the pre-election questionnaire the participants were asked to indicate their voting intentions using a multiple choice question with six response categories. These included a decision to vote for each of the three candidates running at the time -Netanyahu, Mordechai, and Barak, a decision to abstain (voting with a blank slip), indecision, and an open category "other" with a request to elaborate.
Participants were then asked to assess the chances of wining for the three major candidates, each on separate scale ranging from 0 (zero) to 10 (very high). The students were instructed to make these evaluations based on the way they perceived the situation at the present time.
On the post-election questionnaire participants were asked to indicate their actual voting behavior using five alternatives: voted for Netanyahu, voted for Barak, voted with a blank-slip, did not vote, and "other." The estimates for Barak's success before and after the election are shown in Table 2 . Before the election, Netanyahu and Barak's voters were not significantly different in their estimates for Barak's success. After the election, although both groups seemed to show hindsight bias, retroactive estimates made by Netanyahu voters were higher than those made by people who voted for Barak.
Because of the unequal cell sizes (18 vs. 171) the results were analyzed in a step-wise regression model. The pre-election estimates were entered first, followed by a two-level variable representing voter preference (Barak or Netanyahu), with post-election estimates serving as the dependent variable. This analysis yielded a significant contribution for the first variable entered into the regression (pre-election estimates) F(2,186)=71.8, p<.00001
Beta=.528. More importantly, the manner in which people voted (whether they voted for Barak or for Netanyahu) had a significant independent contribution to the prediction of post-election estimates, F=(2,186)=5.05, p<.02 Beta= -.14.
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Evidence of hindsight was also found in estimates made for Netanyhu.
Participants rated his chances lower after the election compared to the estimates indicated on the pre-election questionnaire, Ms. 5.52 vs. 4.58, F(1,187)=23.77 p<.00001. Unlike the estimates which where made for Barak, however, the two voters groups did not differ in the magnitude of their hindsight shift (F<1).
Discussion
The results of the second study again supported the idea that the retroactive estimates of outcome probabilities may serve to render unwelcome outcomes more palatable. For people who voted for Netanyahu and were no doubt disappointed by the election results, the increase in the retroactive odds for Barak represent not just hindsight, but probably an initial step toward coming to terms with the inevitable.
There are several possible explanations to the fact that a mirror image shift was not obtained for estimates made for Netanyahu. Because Netanyhu conceded defeat and retreated into the background almost immediately, while the celebrations of Barak's victory went on for weeks after the election, in processing the outcomes voters may have focused on the winner rather than on the candidate who lost the race. This focus is consistent with research on the feature positive effect, which suggests that people experience greater ease in processing occurrences than nonoccurrences (Allison & Messick, 1988; Fazio, Sherman, & Herr, 1982; Newman, Wolf, & Hearst, 1980) .
One could also hypothesize that for a disappointed voter it is probably easier to admit a misestimate of Barak's chances, rather than a misestimate of Netanyahu's chances. Apart from the fact that such a realization is probably associated with a devaluation of Netanyahu which may be troubling for someone who just voted for him, it may also give rise to the question "if
Netanyahu's chances were this slim, why did I vote for him?"
General Discussion
Before we embark on a new endeavor we often try to evaluate our chances of success, the likelihood that we will reach our goals and accomplish our objectives. According to several expectancy x value motivational formulations, it is this evaluation, coupled with the desirability of the anticipated outcome, which determines our ability to mobilize motivational energy (e.g. , Feather 1990; Kuhl, 1986) . The role of this likelihood of success estimate in our decision to act is crucial. Motivational energy will drop to zero, regardless of the desirability of the outcomes, if achieving these outcomes seems impossible (Brehm & Self, 1989) . At the pre-action stage it seems then that an exaggerated evaluation of the odds favoring success might be instrumental simply to attain the encouragement one needs in order to get one started.
Once already embarked on this new adventure (e.g., the application forms and fee had already been sent out) the perceived odds of success might shift. This will be the time when friends will warn us "not to get our hopes up" or we will remind ourselves that "they only accept a handful" and that because we applied rather late our chances are even less than average.
At this stage lining up some "disclaimers" might be a good idea in an event that we end up with a blow in need of softening (Snyder & Higgins, 1988 ).
Yet it seems that even if we succeeded in curbing our expectations for Mitigating disappointments 17 success the actual experience of disappointment may still be bitter enough to necessitate some further processing to render it palatable.
For those seeking solace following a bitter disappointment the changing of the odds is of course but one option which could be used on its own or perhaps in combination with other more classical self-regulatory mood-repair tactics. Festinger (1957) used the term cognitive dissonance to describe the unpleasant psychological state caused by discrepancies between and among cognitions. Of the different domains in which dissonance was studied, the unpleasant psychological experience it denotes is probably most closely related to disappointment in the case of effort investment. These are situations in which one's efforts fail to produce a desired outcome, or produce an outcome that fails to correspond to expectation (Aronson & Mills 1959 ). Festinger (1957) suggested three modes of reducing dissonance: a change of one of the dissonant elements, an addition of consonant cognitions, and a change in importance through trivialization of the conflict. Thus, faced with a rejection letter one can decide that "the program was not that good after all,"
that "there are clear advantages to other programs," or that "nowadays the actual work experience is far more important then source of the training." If relief is not attained with these classic dissonance-driven tactics one could turn to reevaluation of the odds of getting into the program in the first place.
An inescapable failure might be easier to digest than a failure that could have been easily avoided. The two reported studies provided no direct evidence indicating that the shift in estimates is indeed effective in making people feel better about their disappointments. There are several facts,
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18 however, that seem to be consistent with this interpretation. First, the estimate shift seems to characterize people who experienced disappointment rather than people who were either satisfied with their outcomes, or people who were yet uninformed concerning their outcomes. Second, as we see in study 1, the magnitude of the shift seems to be proportional to the magnitude of the disappointment experienced. In addition, the timing of the shift, the fact that it takes place post-facto, is also consistent with its characterization as an attempt to deal with already known unpleasant outcomes. Finally, the fact that this estimate shift seems to be particularly evident in people with high need for control further supports its characterization as a self-regulatory mood control tactic. 
